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The reality of disablement, being handicapped and physical disfigurement, opens up anew the 
theological debate regarding God-images in human suffering. It is argued that the Hellenistic 
understanding of the power of God, God as a pantokrator [Almighty], presupposes the 
immutability of an apathetic God. In terms of the logic of a cause-effect paradigm, God 
becomes the deterministic principle behind human suffering. With reference to a theologia 
crucis [theology of the Cross], the paradigm of theopaschitic theology proposes a pathetic 
understanding of God. Weakness and vulnerability (astheneia) describes an authentic 
identification of God with human suffering. Forsakenness (derelictio) reframes power as 
compassionate weakness or vulnerability and divine disability. The disabled God is, in terms 
of the New Testament a connection between divine compassion and human predicament 
(ta splanchna), the passionate God. Bowel categories make it possible to speak of the ‘puffing 
God in the wheelchair’. A theology of the cross should be supplemented by a theology of 
ability (theologia resurrectionis). The resurrection introduces the spiritual ability parrhesia − the 
transformation of the weakness of suffering into the fortigenitics of hope. 
Is there place for disability within the realm of Christian 
spirituality and pastoral theology?
In a very recent publication on the plight to connect the traditional understanding of pastoral care 
as cura animarum [the cure of souls] to life experiences, Doris Nauer (2010:70) points out that the 
credibility of pastoral caregiving (Glaubwürdige Seelsorge) is closely connected to the theological 
question regarding the link between images of God and our human experience of suffering, 
isolation, loneliness, helplessness and hopelessness. Pastoral theology is deeply involved in the 
existential and spiritual experience of human beings: in their predicament and suffering, it seems 
as if God is a distanced and remote entity (Nauer ibid:83). Caregiving and spiritual direction 
should therefore give more attention to life issues – and very specifically, questions regarding 
the meaning and purpose of life (Sperry 2002:15) and how this spiritual realm is connected to an 
appropriate understanding of God and the power of God. In more Gestalt-terminology, caregiving 
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Lyding tussen lot en deug binne die dilemma van gestremdheid. Die onwikkeling van ’n 
teologie van die ‘gestremde God, hygend in ’n rolstoel’. Die gegewendheid en realiteit van 
verskillende vorme van gestremdheid onderstreep menslike weerloosheid en magteloosheid. 
Vir gelowiges wat worstel met die vraag na sin in lyding, roep dit onder andere die vraag 
op na die verband tussen lyding en die almag en krag van God. Die basiese argument is 
dat die Hellenistiese konsep en paradigma van die mag van God, God as pantokrator, die 
starre onbeweeglikheid van ’n apatiese God voorveronderstel. Met behulp van die oorsaak-
gevolg skema van denke, word God, in terme van die menslike logika, ’n deterministiese 
kousaliteitsbeginsel en verklaringsmeganisme. Met behulp van ’n teopasgitiese hermeneutiek 
binne die raamwerk van ’n kruisteologie, word aandag gegee aan die opsie van ’n lydende 
en meelydende God (die passie van God). Die swakheid en weerloosheid van God (astheneia) 
beskryf die egtheid en integriteit van God in terme van ’n wesenlike identifikasie met die 
lyding van mense. Verlatenheid (derelictio) transformeer die populêre, dogmatiese siening van 
almags-determinisme in die sensitiewe paradigma van weerlose medelye. ’n Teologie van die 
‘gestremde God’ word ontwikkel in die lig van die teologiese implikasies van ta splanchna op 
’n eksistensiële Godsverstaan. ’n Tipe erbarmingsteologie (‘binnegoed’ of dermteologie) word 
ontwikkel wat help om die metafoor van ’n ‘gestremde God, hygend in ’n rolstoel’ pastoraal te 
verstaan. Met die oog op die omvattende verstaan van hoop, moet ’n kruisteologie aangevul 
word met ’n opstandingsteologie. Die uitwerking van troos op mense met gestremdheid is 
parrhēsia: die moed om te lewe.
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is a form of networking. It connects the vital awareness of an 
organism with different transpersonal structures (Knights 
2001:1–4) that refers to ‘meaning giving’. Within the tradition 
of ‘wisdom-thinking’ (Schipani 2003) of the Old Testament, 
the challenge in pastoral care is to nurture a kind of 
prudence (Pr 8:5) that deals with the presence of God within 
the existential realities of life − a kind of wisdom and faith 
(Miller-McLemore 2006) that incorporates the ‘landscapes of 
the human soul’, namely the shadows of death, dying, doubt 
and injustice (Louw 2012:27). Cura animarum is, in terms of 
wisdom-thinking and spiritual direction (Leech 1986), in fact 
cura vitae [the healing of life] (Louw 2008:11).
From an existential point of view, one can say that life is 
demarcated by limitation, impairment, ailment, disease, 
obstruction, disaster, death and dying. Life is never complete. 
Human beings are actually ‘handicapped beings’: we are 
handicapped due to our vulnerability and mortality. Often in 
life the ‘why’ question is being posed. This question becomes 
more painful when one is faced with unexpected events of 
destruction and loss. When the loss is physical, for example 
in cases of physical disabilities, the ‘meaning’ question 
(Wong 2012:3–7) is often intertwined with the notion of 
undeserved suffering. Hence the question follows regarding 
the connection between human disability, experiences of 
being handicapped, human suffering, the human quest 
for meaning and the challenge it put before Christian 
spirituality, our God-images and the notion of the power, 
and compassion of God. Disability and handicap are variants 
of what Saunders (2010:6) calls ‘spiritual suffering’.
Kool (2002:30–31) very aptly points out that being handicapped 
entails more than physical limitation. It is a cultural entity and 
social qualification too. It is closely connected to the spiritual 
realm of life. Handicap is not a fixed entity in the person, but 
the result of the mutual interaction between the person and 
his or her perception of being handicapped as well as his or 
her framework of life (convictions and commitments). One 
can say that handicap, disability, illness and suffering are all 
categories pointing to hermeneutics − thus the attempt to opt 
for a literature approach and critical assessment of sources 
within the methodology of hermeneutics (i.e. the attempt to 
link texts to contexts and vice versa). 
As a theological problem, handicap and disability touch the 
fibre of the Christian faith, namely our understanding of 
God and his power. Thus the question follows: Is there any 
place for a constructive understanding of human disability 
within theology and a Christian spiritual understanding 
of our being human? This question actually deals with the 
very characteristics of God. It touches the core and heart of 
a Christian anthropology. It questions the basic theological 
and undergirding principles in pastoral caregiving, namely 
the notions of comfort and compassion (Louw 2000:73–117) 
and its connection to a theological understanding of the 
compassion and mercy of God (Davies 2003).
The following slogan by Oscar Pistorius (Coetzee 2011), the 
athlete with physical disability and so-called ‘blade runner’, 
challenges traditional theodicy and the human quest for 
meaning: ‘You are not disabled by the disabilities you have; 
you are abled by the abilities you have.’ 
Is it possible to design a pastoral theology of ‘human ability’, 
despite the limitations of various forms of disability? With 
regard to physical handicaps and mental retardation, what 
is the theological option to toy with the notion of a ‘disabled 
God’?
The theistic God as Deus ex machina
Many traditional models in orthodox theology respond most 
of the times to the crisis of unexpected and tragic life events 
with a cause-and-effect model of interpretation. Behind 
every crisis or form of suffering, the theological challenge is 
to link events with the will and power of God. The notion 
of an omnipotent and impassable deus ex machina [god from 
the machine] has been introduced to provide a solution to 
worldly distress (Schaab 2011:12).
Already in 1963, J.A.T Robinson warned against theism and 
a supranaturalist worldview. He pointed out that instead 
of the deus ex machina concept, the Bible directs God to the 
powerlessness and suffering of God: ‘[O]nly a suffering God 
can help’ (Robinson 1963:39).
However, power (even the power of God) is most of the 
times defined as causative, domination and control (Pasewark 
1993:2). This understanding of power always presents the need 
to defend the notion of God’s omnipotence on philosophical 
and theological grounds, and for reasons of religious life.
The Confession of Faith (Belgic Confession) starts with the 
notion of power as the creation, preservation and government 
of the universe (Psalter Hymnal 1959:3). God as Father (Psalter 
Hymnal ibid):
… watches over us with paternal care, keeping all creatures so 
under his power that not a hair of our head (for they are all 
numbered), nor a sparrow can fall to the ground without the 
will of our Father […] and not one of them falls apart from your 
father’s will. (p. 8)
Although the word will is not mentioned in the Greek text 
of Matthew 10:29 (it literally says ‘without our Father’), the 
interpreters read ‘will of the Father’ into the text in order to ‘save’ 
God as an explanatory principle behind tragic events. In the 
background of the religious mind, God determines everything 
in a cause-and-effect manner so that the will of God should at 
least equal divine power. Divine power is then interpreted 
in terms of cause (first principle) and governance (strength), 
and not in terms of care and compassion (vulnerability).
The challenge to the human mind in suffering and feelings 
of helplessness and severe pain is to reason back to a 
possible cause or logic explanation. The logos or explanatory 
principle is then tagged as the will of God. In this respect, 
God functions as a kind of deus ex machina. The will of God 
is then introduced as part of an eternal plan and fixed divine 
council − thus the notion of the immutability of God. 
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According to Hall (1993:52), the notion of an immutable God 
must certainly be traced to the Greek side of our heritage. 
It was introduced to guard the triune God from kinds of 
passionate involvement that reduced the popular gods of the 
ancient world to personifications and caricatures of human 
follies (Hall ibid:52). Thus follows Hall’s hypothesis (ibid): 
The Christian doctrine of God has tended to accentuate the 
aspects of transcendence and power, as befits a patriarchally 
conceived deity in the service of the empire; but in doing so it 
has severely jeopardized the essence of God testified to in Holy 
scripture, and has risked confining belief in God to contexts 
amenable to ‘positive religion’. (p. 92)
Within the framework of the omniscience of God, life events 
were experienced as a fixed plan or rational schedule. 
The concept of comfort was closely linked to the firm and 
immovable will of God. With reference to catastrophes, 
believers often experience helplessness and then respond 
with the saying that man proposes, but God disposes. A 
kind, stoic attitude develops, resulting in a fatalistic life 
stance and apathetic approach to the so-called ‘undeserved 
forms’ of suffering.
The stoic, monistic worldview attempts to reconcile the 
course of the world (fatum) with God’s providence (pronoia). 
This gives rise to a cosmodicy − a justification of the given 
world as an appearance and manifestation of the divine 
reason. The world’s imperfection is necessary in the light 
of the coming perfection. The evil that lies concealed in 
affective bodily needs and matter, presents a challenge to 
human freedom of will. This challenge can be overcome 
by an apathetic lifestyle. Apathy gives rise to an ethic of 
patience and neutrality towards suffering in order to bring 
about self-sufficiency. Within this rational teleology, suffering 
serves as a means of bringing a person to the perfection of 
self-sufficiency. 
The outcome of this deterministic and very passive approach 
is fatalism: qua sera, sera [whatever will be, will be]. Divine 
omnipotence became a case of ‘giving to God that which 
belongs exclusively to Caesar’ (Pittenger quoted in Hall 
1993:54). With the concept of a powerful omnipotent deity, 
theology wanted to uphold the image of a strong and potent 
God, fully in control of every second of life. However, if God 
initiates every tragedy, pain and all forms of suffering and 
disfigurement, what is then the meaning of the compassion 
of God? Or is it indeed the notion of compassion that can 
transform the immutability of an iron God into the passion of 
a disabled and co-suffering God? 
The predicament of being 
handicapped and disabled
A very recent publication by Claassens, Swartz and Hansen 
(2013) underlines the predicament regarding disability, the 
human quest for meaning and dignity, and a theological 
approach to human impairment. The authors underline the 
importance of the role of theology to promote a more sensitive 
approach to disability within the public sphere of life.
The World Health Organization describes disability as an 
impairment of some biological, physical or psychological 
origin that causes an activity limitation or inability to 
function in some usual way which can vary in different 
contexts − a participation restriction, affecting involvement 
in life situations (Gaventa 2012:292). However, the important 
challenge to pastoral caregivers is to probe into the realm 
of presuppositions, prejudice, worldviews and attitudes 
(Gaventa ibid:292): ‘[W]hat we think about the impairment 
and functional limitation − our assumptions, values, and 
attitudes − is often the bigger “handicap”.’
Within the current projection of ‘healthism’ in film and the 
social media, it is indeed difficult to detect what is meant by 
disability. As Reynolds (2008) states: 
One prominent way that consumerism is disabling is in its 
promotion of youthful attractiveness and vitality. Multiple 
industries are supported by the obsession with youthfulness, 
connected up with the ideals of efficiency and novelty. The young 
are physiologically and developmentally fresh, vital, mobile, 
adaptive, eager, innovative, and adventurous. (p. 96)
Kool (2002:30–31) points out that the classification of being 
handicapped is, from a social perspective, a functional issue 
due to restrictions in terms of communication, relations and 
movement. The person in him- or herself is not a handicapped 
being. Handicap is not a fixed entity in the person, but the 
result of the mutual interaction between the person and his 
or her handicap, and the structural and social environment. 
One should therefore rather refer to persons ‘with a handicap’ 
than to ‘handicapped persons’. It all depends on the 
assessment from the environment and the others’ reactions. 
Handicap entails more than physical limitation. It is also a 
cultural entity and social qualification.
The same argument can be used in the case of disabilities. 
Eiesland (1994:24) argues that people with disabilities are 
distinguished from others − not because of their shared 
physical, psychological or emotional traits, but because 
‘temporarily able-bodied’ persons single them out for 
differential treatment. Often this approach leads to the 
impression that, due to physical impairments, disabled people 
are not merely different, but classified as ‘abnormal’. This leads 
to a common set of stigmatising values and arrangements 
that actually work against the person with disabilities.
Eiesland (1994:27) draws specific attention to terminology 
in this regard. ‘Impairment’ refers to an abnormality or 
loss of physiological form or function. ‘Disability’ describes 
the consequences of the impairment that is an inability to 
perform some task or activity considered necessary within 
a social environment. ‘Handicap’ generally denotes a social 
disadvantage that results from an impairment or disability. 
Impairment does not necessarily result in a disability and a 
disability does not need to be a handicap.
Persons with disabilities are therefore characterised as a 
minority group, shaped primarily by exclusion − hence 
the importance of accessibility as a social-symbolic, physical 
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and legal inclusion in common life. Physical disabilities 
also challenge the God-image which theology applies to 
relate irreversible impairment to the will and omnipotence 
(power) of God (Louw 2000:45–73). Is it possible to replace 
deterministic God-images with more compassionate God-
images in order to develop a theology of compassion and 
comfort that can empower people with disabilities? How can 
theology contribute to a more pastoral and sensitive approach 
to disabilities in order to convey a sense of human dignity? 
Can a theology of compassion contribute to processes of 
destigmatisation?
The sin-disability conflation in 
theology
Spiritual and religious perspectives should, theologically 
speaking, also be questioned and rethought. A good example 
in this regard is the sin-disability conflation. Eiesland (1994:70) 
points out that a persistent view in the Christian tradition has 
been that disability denotes an unusual relationship with God 
and that the person with disabilities is either divinely blessed 
or damned: the spiritual superhero or the defiled evildoer. 
For example, a unilateral and biased exegesis is evident in 
several biblical texts (e.g. Lv 21:17–23) that prohibited people 
with disabilities and physical handicaps from entering the 
most holy place in the temple. The sin-disability paradigm 
also functions in John 9:1–3. When Jesus encountered a 
man born blind, his disciples asked whether the man or his 
parents sinned. The presupposition is that there should be an 
explanation for being handicapped in terms of the existing 
cause-effect schema of interpretation. This deterministic 
schema raises the issue of whether physical disability is a 
travesty of the divine image and an inherent desecration of 
all things holy. 
Despite the tendency to assess our ‘being handicapped’ as 
pathology, it will be argued that disability and vulnerability 
should not be viewed as ‘abnormal’ (deterministic tragedy), 
but as ‘normal’ (existential reality). It is normal, because 
life in itself is embedded in a network of different forms 
of vulnerability and limitations or impairments. Disability 
should therefore be assessed as a normal category of human 
life; as an ontological quality of being. As Reynolds (2008) 
puts it: 
Disability is an unavoidable part of all human agencies. Different 
individuals, ‘disabled in different ways and degrees, can have 
their own peculiar talents and possibilities and their own 
difficulties’. While some people may struggle with a higher 
degree of disability than others, all human beings are disabled 
to some degree − often unpredictably and at different periods of 
our lives − from infancy to old age. (p. 106) 
It is the contention of Reynolds (2008:33) that disability is 
not about others and ‘them’. It is about us and the skewed 
paradigms and perceptions of a so-called ‘healthy’ and 
‘normal’ society. Reynolds (ibid) thus advocates for a more 
holistic definition of disability beyond the categories of a 
medical model (an impairment that needs to be healed by 
an aggressive intervention). Disability is a term naming that 
interstice where (1) restrictions due to an involuntary bodily 
impairment, (2) social role expectations, and (3) external 
physical or social obstructions come together in a way that 
(4) pre-empts an intent participation in normal life. With 
reference to the spiritual dimension at stake, one could say 
that disability becomes a theological issue when (5) the 
involuntary bodily impairment is justified by a theology 
that links the will of God as a principle cause or explanation 
for the impairment. Disability then becomes a spiritual flaw 
that labels the impairment as a curse or punishment, and so 
becomes a problem of an inclusive theodicy − the attempt 
to link the providence of God to suffering and vulnerability 
through the logic of rational reasoning. 
If it is true that disability is a feature of our ‘being-in-this-
world’, and if it is true that a person with disabilities gives 
others the precious insight into the woundedness and 
weakness of human life (Moltmann quoted in Reynolds 
2008:117), what then is the impact of vulnerability and 
disability on the very being of God? How does disability and 
being handicapped change the theological categories that we 
apply to demonstrate divine compassion? 
The affliction of virtuous suffering
Another theological paradigm that adds to the marginalisation 
and stigmatisation of suffering people is what can be called 
virtuous suffering (Eiesland 1994:72). The account of the 
apostle Paul’s ‘thorn in the flesh’ as sign of divine grace (2 Cor 
12:7–10), has been influential in supporting what Eiesland 
(1994) calls, a Christian theology of virtuous suffering. Righteous 
submission to divine testing is upheld as a praiseworthy 
disposition for Christian disciples. Impairments become 
signs of divine election by which the righteous are purified 
and perfected through painful trials. Disability is represented 
as a temporary affliction that must be endured to gain 
heavenly rewards.
Within the context of the traditional theodicy discourse, the 
view that all forms of suffering or human impairment should 
be endured in order to discover something good or to attain 
spiritual growth, is called the gubernatio approach. Suffering 
and impairment are viewed teleologically as a process or 
means of attaining some or other higher goal (gubernatio). 
Suffering then becomes a kind of virtue.
Within the Irenaeus tradition, there is the understanding that 
God created a world that included evil with a view to the end 
goal of a perfect world. In his work Evil and the God of Love, 
Hick (1966) argues that the Fall is a necessary feature of all 
creatureliness. Humans are in the process of becoming perfect 
beings who conform to God’s original purpose. Human 
autonomy must develop into goodness, thus necessitating 
the possibility of both good and evil. There is an intellectual 
gap between God and humans which affords humans the 
space to grow towards perfection. Evil serves a purpose in 
this process: it is necessary for one’s freedom and ultimate 
goodness. The conflict between good and evil will be resolved 
eschatologically in the eternal life. In the meantime, to endure 
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suffering with courage is a means to prove the strength of 
one’s faith. To suffer is then becoming a kind of masochistic 
prerequisite for attaining ‘holiness’. The implication of such 
an understanding of suffering is that sanctification determines 
justification − the imperative (ought) the indicative (being 
functions) and not vice versa. The further implication is that 
determinism and fatalism prevail.
The background of many theodicy theories is often the 
presupposition that the physical world is a created order that 
mirrors a divine archetype reckoned to be intrinsically ‘good’. 
The world and creation reflects in itself a divine intention. 
‘Normalcy’ is thereby given a theological credence. Tragedy 
and abnormalities are perceived as inverse reflections of 
God’s purpose − a tragic mark of something gone wrong 
(Reynolds 2008): 
Disability quickly becomes a sign of imperfection, a flaw in 
God’s good order, something to be undone. And because of this, 
theodicy questions foster an understanding of disability that 
leads down an erroneous path. (p. 30)
Eiesland (1994) argues that virtuous suffering encourages 
passivity and resignation, and has institutionalised depression 
and helplessness as an appropriate response to ‘divine testing’. 
He (Eiesland 1994) states that:
… the theology of virtuous suffering has encouraged persons 
with disabilities to acquiesce to social barriers as a sign of 
obedience to God and to internalise second-class status inside 
and outside the church. (p. 73)
According to Eiesland (1994:73–74), the biblical theme of 
charitable giving has also shaped patterns of interaction 
between able-bodied individuals and those with disabilities. 
Instead of religious inclusion and meeting the requirement 
of justice, these practices often lead to marginalisation. The 
practice of individualistic charity and healing often neglect 
the social and political needs of people with disabilities, 
leading to social exclusion. The point is that believers often 
argue that if one provides in the physical needs of people 
and if the society or community are good to disabled people, 
our charity is enough. ‘In short, through such actions, the 
Christian church became a prime facilitator of charitable 
practices that segregated people with disabilities’ (Eiesland 
ibid:74). Charitable giving becomes an excuse not to become 
involved in matters of human dignity and the deep-seated 
spiritual needs regarding justice and the human quest for 
meaning.
However, to overcome stigmatisation more than charity 
is needed. The question is about the character of our 
involvement. How are we engaged with the being functions 
of disabled people in order to be with them in such a way 
that they discover meaning in life and are empowered to live 
a dignified life? What is the quality of our compassion? What 
is the intention behind the charitable act?
Furthermore, can we minister a God-image that is linked 
to the predicament of being handicapped and disabled − a 
God-image that reveal not an apathetic God, but a pathetic 
God who is in fact identified with all kinds of impairment 
and disability? In terms of the vulnerability or weakness 
(astheneia) of a crucified God (theologia crucis), is it even 
possible to speak of a ‘disfigured’ and ‘handicapped’ God?
Theopaschitic theology: The weak 
(astheneia) and disabled God
Paul argues for the weakness (astheneia) of God in terms of 
a theology of the cross (1 Cor 1:25). The cross could then be 
viewed as a theological reflection and a fundamental critique 
− even a protest and lament − on woundedness, weakness, 
disfigurement, ailment, vulnerability, marginalisation and 
stigmatisation. Hence, with reference to the link between 
disability, human suffering and the presence of God in 
suffering, the theological question follows: Is it possible to 
speak of the ‘suffering God’?
This question refers to the act that in every era, the ubiquity 
of pain, suffering, disfigurement and death, endemic within 
the cosmos and endured by the creatures, has provoked 
poignant and perplexing questions (Schaab 2011:3). The 
attempt to fathom and reconcile painful experiences of 
suffering with belief in an all-loving and all-powerful 
God, has led to several attempts by theologians to design a 
theodicy and to shore up the delicate balance between the 
experience of cosmic tragedy and the belief in an all-good 
God (Schaab ibid:3–4). The point is that the reality of suffering 
has persistently impelled theological debate concerning 
the relationship of God to suffering (Schaab ibid:11). The 
conceivability of the suffering of God has traditionally been 
called the theopaschitic model.
The theopaschitic approach clearly links God with 
suffering. The cross completes this link and this reveals 
God as a ‘pathetic’ being. He is the ‘suffering God’. In 
Het theopaschitisme, Feitsma (1956:143) calls this form of 
theopaschitism (redefining God’s being in terms of suffering) 
the most ultimate expression in theology of what is meant 
by God’s compassion.
In the effort to identify God with human suffering, 
theopaschitism became the theory or doctrine by which 
theology tries to construe a more existential and passionate 
approach to our understanding of God’s presence within the 
reality of human suffering. The issue of identification with 
the predicament of our being human (injustice, poverty, 
stigmatisation, discrimination, stereotyping, illness, violence, 
the abuse of power, tsunamis, catastrophes) has become of 
the uttermost importance for a new understanding of the 
meaning of Christian hope and spiritual healing. 
Transcendence versus condescendence
A theopaschitic approach, which leans strongly towards 
empathy, acceptance and sympathetic understanding in 
pastoral care, has been welcomed by those theologians who 
want to reframe paradigms regarding God’s will (Moltmann 
1972). No longer is God seen as static and absolute, but 
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rather as dynamic, thereby opening up the future for human 
existence. Although the pathos concept suggests evidence of 
God’s genuine involvement in suffering, there is a danger 
that the distinction between the passio Dei [divine passion] 
and the passio hominum [suffering of human beings] can easily 
fall away. God’s sovereignty (transcendence) can easily be 
sacrificed by an overemphasis on God’s enfleshment and 
identification (condescension).
Inbody (1997:140) captures this problem very aptly when he 
argues that, in our attempt to rethink the meaning of divine 
power, two things can happen: 
1. Our God-image can become ‘too small’, or ‘too big’. If 
God can only empathise with the suffering of the world, 
but can do nothing about it, God is too small. If God is 
identified with nature and can do nothing more than what 
positivists mean by natural law, God is too small. If God 
is identified with human capacities, abilities, creativity or 
human ideals, then God is minimalised. 
2. On the other hand, if God is identified with omnipotent 
power, as the kind of power that can do ‘just anything’, 
God is too big. When a theistic notion of divine 
omnipotence portrays God’s kingdom in terms of an 
empire, he becomes too militant and strong. God is then 
merely a Hellenistic ‘pantokrator’, that is an all-powerful 
God who can do everything and is the instigator of all 
modes of human suffering.
It becomes clear that suffering, as a theological issue, creates a 
tension: the tension between God’s sovereignty (power) and 
his solidarity (pathos). An overemphasis of God’s identification 
with suffering presents the danger that God’s immanent 
experience is traded for his sovereignty. On the other hand, 
a theology that emphasises God’s sovereignty and his 
punishment, thereby distancing God from suffering, incurs 
the danger of presenting God as alienated from reality. 
Theologia crucis: The connection between 
human suffering and God’s being
For the advocates of a theologia crucis, the cross of Christ 
becomes the proof that God is not unyielding and sadistic, but 
is deeply affected by evil. God identifies with suffering and is 
not apathetic towards it. In his sympathetic involvement with 
suffering, God shows his compassion, thereby proclaiming 
that suffering is directly opposed to his will. 
In section 21 of his Heidelberg disputations, Luther (1518) 
declares that, whilst a theology of glory speaks well of the 
bad and calls the bad good, it is the theology of the cross that 
describes essential reality and perceives being in terms of its 
essential characteristics (Theologus gloriae dicit malum bonum 
et bonum malum, Theologus crucis dicit id quod res est). In section 
20, Luther (ibid) says that the visible and the (future) aspects 
not yet revealed concerning the presence of God should be 
perceived from the perspective of suffering and the cross 
(Sed qui visibilia et posteriora Dei per passiones et crucem conspect 
intelligit). The cross becomes a resource of comprehension and 
understanding. Not only does Luther defend himself against 
any natural or self-glorifying theology in these sections, he 
also proclaims the pastoral dimension of the cross, namely 
that God relates to human suffering. 
Von Loewenich (1976:18) interprets Luther’s disputation as an 
indication that the cross is not merely a subject of theological 
discussion, but constitutes in itself a definite theology. The 
cross does not merely play a role in our assurance of salvation. 
It is the very epicentre of all theological statements. The cross 
of Christ and the cross of the Christian belong together. The 
cross of Christ reveals the nature (the how) of the relationship 
between God and human beings. 
In the very beginnings of the Christian era, Ignatius of 
Antioch spoke of God’s suffering. However, according to 
Leech (1985:301), the crucial step towards understanding 
the identification of Christ’s pain with God’s pain was the 
formula of the Council of Ephesus of 431 concerning the 
divine motherhood of Mary. Ephesus proclaimed that Mary 
was Theotokos − the God-bearer, the mother of God. She was 
the mother of God’s flesh. It was this assertion that, after 
centuries of reflection, led to the theopaschitic formula − the 
claim that God had suffered in the flesh. For, as Gregory of 
Nazianen (Leech ibid:301) had stressed: ‘[W]e need a God 
made flesh and put to death in order that we could live again.’ 
Gregory speaks of ‘the blood of God’ and of ‘the crucified 
God’ − terms that were later adopted by Luther, who speaks 
of the Deus crucifixus. 
For Luther, the sole authentic locus of our human knowledge 
of God is the cross of Christ in which God is to be found 
revealed and yet, paradoxically, hidden in that revelation 
(McGrath 1985:149, 161–175). God is revealed in the passiones 
et crucem − yet he is hidden in this very revelation. God’s 
divinity is revealed in the very things that human wisdom 
regards as the antithesis of deity (such as weakness, folly and 
humility) − God is revealed in the humility and shame of 
the cross. Luther’s argumentation implies the fundamental 
insight that the proper disposition for justification is 
humility. The righteousness that God demands is not ‘good 
works’, but the humilitas fidei [humility of faith]. Sinners can 
only be justified when, in total humiliation, they cry out to 
God for grace. Before grace can be granted to sinners, they 
must be forced to admit the total inadequacy of their own 
soteriological resources and turn to God in emptiness and 
prayer (see McGrath ibid:153).
At the cross God is hidden (Deus absconditus). Because of our 
existential predicament (Anfechtung), we are forced into a 
state of absolute despair. However, in faith we reach out to 
this hidden God. Thus, faith becomes a kind of existential 
understanding of this dialectic: to recognise oneself as a 
guilty criminal before God’s wrath and then to flee to this 
very God, although apparently absent (hidden at the cross). 
Through this realisation, one is moved to flee to God against 
God (ad deum contra Deum; McGrath 1985:173). Anfechtung 
then becomes a kind of vehicle to connect faith to God.
Original Research
doi:10.4102/ids.v48i1.1692http://www.indieskriflig.org.za
Page 7 of 10
The German term Anfechtung describes a state of hopelessness 
and helplessness which has strong affinities with the concept 
anxiety (Angst). The terms that Luther use when discussing 
Anfechtung (see McGrath 1985:170) illuminate the various 
aspects of the concept. It is a form of temptation (tentatio) 
which takes place through an assault upon human beings 
(impugnatio) and is intended to put them to the test (probatio). 
This Anfechtung refers to both the objective assault of spiritual 
forces upon the believer, and the subjective anxiety and 
doubt that arise within us as a consequence of these assaults. 
However, when believers recognise God’s merciful intention 
that underlies Anfechtung, they rejoice in such assaults − 
seeing in them the means by which God indirectly effects 
and ensures our salvation. For this reason, Luther is able to 
refer to Anfechtung as a ‘delicious despair’ (McGrath ibid:171) 
and a vital ingredient in a theopaschitic interpretation of 
the cross.
Ngien (1995:175) concludes: ‘[T]he suffering of God has 
an ‘ontological status’ in Luther’s theologia crucis.’ The 
implication of Luther’s theologia crucis on the traditional 
understanding that only the humanity of Christ suffers on 
the cross whilst Christ’s divine nature is untouched, is that 
God indeed suffered in his Son. ‘God suffers on the cross in 
oneness with the person of Jesus Christ who is ontologically 
constitutive of God’ (Ngien ibid:175). So, for Luther, the 
Father suffers in compassion with the Son in the Spirit of love 
between them. In the light of God’s expiatory suffering, the 
fundamental truth of the Christian faith consists in the fact 
that God, in the passion history of Jesus Christ, has suffered 
the curse of death, the misery of infinite suffering and, 
eventually, suffered them into defeat. 
The essential theological point is that Christ’s suffering cannot 
be separated from God’s suffering. The motivation behind 
such a ‘paschitic formula’ is to link our human suffering to 
God’s identification with our pain and misery. 
Some of the most important proponents of theopaschitism 
in the 20th century were the following: 
1. God’s weakness (Bonhoeffer 1970). By his suffering, 
God shows that he is weak, vulnerable and powerless 
in this world. Only Christ’s weakness can help us to 
resist suffering in an attitude of protest or resistance and 
surrender (Widerstand und Ergebung). 
2. God’s powerlessness (Sölle 1973). In her book, Leiden, Sölle 
objects to the sadistic image of God evident in traditional 
theodicy. She portrays Christ as God’s representative who 
introduces himself as the One who suffers with humans. 
Wherever people suffer, there Christ suffers. God suffers 
particularly in the social and political dimensions of 
suffering. God justifies himself in political suffering. He 
remains powerless and is dependent on us to bring about 
change. As Christ’s representatives, it is thus our task to 
eliminate social and political suffering. 
3. God’s being as an event of becoming (Gottes Sein ist im 
Werden; Jüngel 1967). God’s revelation of himself is 
not complete. This does not mean that God himself is 
incomplete, but rather that God reveals himself as a Für-
sich-sein [a Being for himself] who, in his grace, is also a 
Für-uns-sein [a Being for us]. In his capacity as a Being for 
us, God becomes involved in the suffering of humankind, 
and thus he becomes a suffering God for sinners in a 
dynamic act of revelation. In these events of ‘God being 
for us’, God’s Being is still in the process of becoming 
(incomplete). 
4. God’s forsakenness (dereliction; Moltmann 1972). God’s 
dynamic involvement in suffering is a Trinitarian event, 
the true character of which has been revealed by the 
cross. In the God-forsakenness of the cross (derelictio), 
God is the Ganz Andere [totally Other] who does not 
have to be justified by humankind. On the cross, God 
justifies himself as the One who pronounces justification 
on humankind. He does this by completely identifying 
himself with human suffering and displaying solidarity 
with human forsakenness. 
5. God’s defencelessness (Berkhof 1973; Wiersinga 1972). 
Wiersinga rejects the notion that suffering is punishment 
for sin. For him, there is no likelihood of God’s justice 
being punitive or retaliatory. He contends that it can be 
discounted that God is the origin of suffering or that he 
wills suffering and has accommodated it in his providence. 
The only connection between God and suffering is that 
he himself suffers with us. Here God reveals himself 
as the defenceless God. According to Berkhof (ibid), 
God’s defencelessness is the space that he has left for 
the freedom of human responsibility. Berkhof does not 
regard this defencelessness as mere powerlessness, but as 
a display of God’s overwhelming love (power).
Theologia crucis: The weakness (astheneia) of 
God in passion
Whilst Luther’s theology of the cross has a strong pastoral 
theme (God’s relationship with humans in their suffering) 
and should primarily be assessed as an attempt to unmask 
the falsehood of a theologia gloria, Barth tries to indicate 
the reality of God’s condescension as revealed in Christ’s 
humiliation. In terms of a Barthian approach, a theologia 
crucis reveals the authenticity of God’s condescension and 
thus ‘proves’ God’s companionship and solidarity with our 
suffering through Christ, the Mediator. For Barth, suffering 
can indeed be linked to God in the sense that God took our 
distress upon himself. 
God takes our distress upon himself. In the Redeemer, God as 
judge enters into our need. He is ‘for us’ (Barth 1953:236–362) in 
the condemned Christ (substitution). This ‘being for us’ is a 
deliberate action by Christ. It occurs only once in history and 
is an action by God performed in the Person, Jesus Christ. 
Thus, his suffering can be understood as ‘Passion Gottes’ 
(Barth ibid:270).
One of the most well-known theologians in the theologia crucis 
debate in the 20th century, and even still in the 21st century, 
is Jürgen Moltmann.
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A theology of the cross cuts through all dezification of human 
beings and all metaphysical abstractions of God (theism). It is 
thus a radical theology which aims at influencing theism with 
its abstract image of God. It is also secularised Christendom 
with its blind ‘ungodliness’. The theology of the cross once 
again emphasises the solidarity of God in the midst of the 
history of suffering. 
Moltmann’s theology of the cross is based on the premise that 
if the suffering on the cross is in fact a Messianic suffering, 
then God himself is involved in the suffering. By this premise, 
Moltmann breaks away from Aristotle’s metaphysical 
theistic view of God as being immovable, apathetic and 
unchanging. A theology of the cross means a radical change 
in Western Christianity’s concept of God. The God-concept 
inspired by the Greeks is one of apathy, with immutability 
as a static-ontic category. In contrast, a theology of the cross 
is a ‘pathetic theology’ in which God’s pathos, not his apatheia 
(Moltmann 1972:256), is emphasised. It is in pathos that God 
reveals himself in such a way that he becomes involved in 
loving solidarity with human suffering. An apathetic God 
moulds a human being into a homo apatheticus; a pathetic God 
moulds a human being into a homo sympatheticus.
In Jesus’ resurrection, God is the God in action. In the 
crucifixion, he is the God in passion. The latter is not a static 
God, but a dynamic God who is actively involved in the God-
forsaken cry of Christ on the cross: ‘My God, my God, why 
have you forsaken me?’ Jesus’ cry from the cross (derelictio) 
outlines a Trinitarian theology of the cross. This cry defines 
God’s ‘how’ in suffering. Therefore, in this sense (namely 
that suffering is indeed a mode of God’s very being and his 
mediatory involvement in our pain God is indeed a divine 
identification with human impairment and weakness), this 
article opts for the notion of a ‘disabled God’.
Theologia resurrectionis: The abled God in action
It is indeed true that tragedy forces theology to acknowledge 
the vulnerability of a suffering God (Schaab 2011:11–12). Is such 
a God-image, however, the only appropriate understanding 
of God? What about our human need for courage, strength, 
empowerment, change and transformation? 
According to Moltmann, without the resurrection, God’s 
identification with human suffering (even the cross) would 
be meaningless. The suffering on the cross becomes a source 
of hope for a suffering humanity only when it is seen in the 
light of Jesus’ resurrection. This is what makes the theology 
of the cross essentially an eschatologia crucis. 
The message of God’s faithfulness is inextricably linked to 
the transformative reality of the cross and the victorious 
event, namely the resurrection. Being ‘saved in hope’ makes 
us more than conquerors. That God is indeed an ‘abled God’ 
is demonstrated by a theologia resurrectionis.
In Theologie des Neuen Testaments, Goppelt (1980:56) argued 
that the message of resurrection forms the heart and core 
of New Testament theology. From the perspective of the 
resurrection, the existing situation of the early church could 
be analysed in view of its transformation and its focus on 
the future. The resurrection message forms the basis of New 
Testament theology. In view of the central role of hope in 
theology, Guthrie (1981:389) asserts that ‘[t]he reality of the 
resurrection is, therefore, an indispensable basis for Christian 
hope in the future’. Resurrection and suffering are two 
themes that cannot exist separately. 
In A theology of Auschwitz, Simon (1967) does not regard the 
resurrection as an easy way out of suffering and pain, but 
rather that the resurrection incorporates them into a new 
perspective on life. Resurrection faith does not retreat from 
the reality of suffering, but confirms the tragedy of suffering 
(Simon ibid:101). Since the resurrection is not only a new 
perspective, but also a historic reality, it has consequences for 
hope. Hope is actually resurrection hope (Moltmann 1966).
The implication of both a theopaschitic theology and a theology 
of the resurrection, is that it reframes our understanding of 
divine power. It proposes a paradigm shift from power as 
force (the pantokrator image) to power as steadfast faithfulness, 
compassionate encouragement and active hope. Theopaschitic 
theology revises a theology of Caesar-power into a theology 
of compassionate empowerment.
Fretheim’s conclusion (1984) is remarkable: 
For, even in those instances where the vestments of God’s 
appearance are threaded with lineaments of power, they clothe 
in vulnerable form. There is no such thing for Israel as a non-
incarnate God. (p. 106) 
According to Häring (1986), God is not a pantokrator − neither 
should he be seen in terms of Aristotle’s potentia. God’s 
power is his redeeming vulnerability and powerlessness − 
omnipotence is God’s loving invitation ‘to a relationship and 
covenant encounter which guarantees real freedom’. 
According to Van de Beek (1984:91–92), behind the concept 
omnipotence lies the motive to see God as the absolute One 
− the Super King with a driving force (despotes). Behind 
every event God functions as the prima causa. Van de Beek 
is convinced that more fundamental than Berkhof’s ‘weerloze 
overmacht’, is the overwhelming phenomenon of God’s 
majestic highness and splendid glory. God’s dominion and 
sovereignty exist in the interest of humankind. His aim is to 
conquer the evil powers of sin and darkness. 
The theological praxis of ta 
splanchna
It is the author’s contention that the passio dei is an exposition 
of the praxis concept of ta splanchna. The latter is related to 
the Hebrew root rhm [to have compassion]. It is used in close 
connection to the root hnn which means ‘to be gracious’. 
Together with oiktirmos and hesed it expresses the being 
quality of God as connected to human vulnerability and 
suffering (Esser 1976:598). The verb splanchnizomai is used to 
make the unbounded mercy of God visible.
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Within metaphoric speech, ta splanchna expresses pity, 
compassion and love. ‘The oldest form of the verb is 
splanchneuō, eat the entrails, prophesy from the entrails’ (Esser 
1976:599). Within the messianic context of Christ’s salvific 
mission, ta splanchna expresses compassion as an indication 
of God’s divine involvement with the human predicament 
of suffering.
It is interesting to note the cases where Christ responded 
to human suffering with the contraction of the entrails, 
expressing messianic compassion. For example, the leper 
with his petition (Mk 1:41), the people like sheep without a 
shepherd (Mk 6:34), the sight of the harassed and exhausted 
crowd (Mt 9:36), the two blind men who besought him 
(Mt 20:34) and the widow at Nain, mourning her only son 
(Lk 7:13). In Luke 15:11–32 (the parable of the prodigal son), 
splanchnizomai expresses the strongest feeling of a merciful 
and loving reaction (verse 20). In the parable of the Good 
Samaritan (Lk 10:33), splanchnizomai expresses the attitude of 
complete willingness to use all means, time, strength and life 
for saving at the crucial moment (Esser 1976:600).
Ta splanchna reveals God as a Presence, ‘a Companion, “your 
God”‘(Hall 1993:147). The ta splanchna texts totally reframe 
our understanding of who God is and what is meant by God’s 
power which is now understood as passion and compassion. 
Not in the mode of Ceasar-like power, but the ‘fortigenetics’, 
resilience or existential boldness of an eschatological 
understanding of hope: ‘Against all hope, Abraham in hope 
believed’ (Rm 4: 18). 
If ta splanchna displays the seriousness of God’s ‘being with’ 
and ‘being within’, bowel categories reveal the ontological 
seriousness and vulnerability of God’s faithfulness. It 
demonstrates what Reynolds (2008:123) calls ‘the moral 
fabric of love: availability’. Bowel categories then indicate the 
integrity and sincerity of God in suffering. Bowel categories 
also display a Divine ‘being with’ which make it possible 
for the metaphor of ‘the puffing God in the wheelchair’ 
(Reynolds ibid) – a compassionate mode1 of hopeful ‘being 
with within’ despite a wheelchair. 
‘Together, people with disabilities and the able-bodied, must 
be reconciled with the disabled God through Jesus Christ’s 
broken body in Eucharistic repentance and celebration’ 
(Eiesland 1994:25). 
Conclusion
Asthenaia refers to all forms of human sickness, ailments, 
diseases, disabilities and general human weakness in the 
Bible. The cross of Christ could be viewed as an icon of the 
disabled God. In terms of metaphoric speech, one can say 
that in the sigh and derelictio cry of the suffering and dying 
Christ, one hears the sigh and ‘puffing’ of disabled people. 
1.‘In the posture of compassion I am brought to resist dehumanising powers and defend 
the refusal or abuse of another’s vulnerable face, making his or her cause my own. Thus 
compassion signifies a mutual relation of vulnerability that exists beyond conditions 
established by the status quo’ (Reynolds 2008:128).
God is indeed becoming, in the disfigurement of the crucified 
Christ, the disabled figure − ‘puffing in his wheelchair’.
This painting depicts the ‘suffering God’ within the realm 
of death. The many crosses in the background refer to the 
many deaths of martyrs and undeserved suffering. The 
disabled body presents God’s identification with human 
disfigurement.
The suffering and dying God within a theologia crucis 
demonstrates the reality of an inclusive compassion of 
replacement: to carry the burden of woundedness on behalf 
of the other. ‘Compassion signifies participative connection, 
what we might call sympathetic attunement’ (Reynolds 
2008:126). 
Disability is not a fault, mistake or tragedy that must be 
overcome by the individual with a kind of curative medical 
model (Reynolds 2008:30). Disability is a reality of our being 
human within the vulnerability of life. With regard to a 
theology of the intestines, disabilities should be embraced 
as part of an affirmed being. Within a theologia resurrectionis, 
all forms of stigmatisation should be deleted due to the 
fact that resurrection makes us resistant to the death of 
discrimination (die opstandigheid van die opstanding). Bowel 
categories designate hope as a new state of being beyond 
the limitations of disabled categories. It describes a spiritual 
ability within the new reality of parrhesia categories: the 
boldness of a ‘courage to be’ and the vividness of a hope 
that can transcend the boundaries of all forms of human 
limitations and disfigurement.
Source: Louw, D.J., 2013, The disabled God, Chapel, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch
FIGURE 1: The disabled God.
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